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1. Introduction 
For the first time since the large refugee movements of the 1990s, which followed the breakup of 
the bipolar order that had dominated Europe since the 1950s, a refugee crisis tops European policy 
debate. The earlier crisis resulted from the political restructuring of South-Eastern Europe after the 
Balkan wars and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which had displaced about 2,700,000 people by 
the end of 1995, over 700,000 of whom sought asylum in European Union (EU) member states 
(see UNHCR, 2000). The current movements are due primarily to the events that followed the 
2001 bombings of New York’s twin towers and the uprising in the Middle East commonly known 
as the “Arab Spring”. In 2015 alone, Europe received a total of 1.5 million asylum applications, 
an unprecedented high that is almost double the previous 1992 peak of 850,000. 
At least three features distinguish the present refugee crisis from that in the early 1990s: First, the 
refugee movements of the early 1990s happened in the aftermath of decades of cold war, a dark 
era from which an optimistic Europe emerged eager to embrace new economic opportunities and 
European integration and enlargement. The current crisis, in contrast, falls upon an enlarged 
Europe, still entangled in the aftershocks of a deep recession, riddled by populist and separatist 
national movements, and challenged by deeply divergent views about how to address this 
humanitarian crisis. Second, whereas the Balkan wars were considered mainly a Western 
responsibility, and Western resolve finally helped to restore stability, the current crisis involves a 
multitude of actors and geo-political interests over which Western nations have limited power. 
And third, the refugees who are currently heading towards Europe are perceived to be culturally 
more distinct and greater in number than those in the early 1990s.  
As a result of these differences, the current crisis is characterized by at least three political 
challenges: First, and most important, European nations can only marginally influence the primary 
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causes of the conflicts inducing current refugee flows. There is thus no clear indication of when 
such flows might abate, and no clear time frame for when those who have fled the conflict can be 
resettled, if at all. Such a lack of predictability creates uncertainty and concern among the 
populations in the receiving countries, whose fears are easily exploitable by populist movements. 
Second, the dire economic situations in which many European countries find themselves, coupled 
with the different views about humanitarian responsibilities, impede political progress and 
solutions. Lastly, the lack of a clear legal framework; the unsuitability of past regulations, which 
have led to confusing ad-hoc exceptions; the differences in implementation and interpretation of 
the underlying Geneva Convention for Refugees across European countries; and the challenges 
that the current crisis poses for the Schengen Agreement have led to a situation in which political 
progress is proving extremely difficult.  
In this paper, we provide background and shed new light on the complexities of the refugee crisis 
Europe faces. We first answer the question “who is a refugee?” (section 2). We start from the 
definition laid out in the 1951 Geneva Convention for Refugees (GCR) and emphasize the 
tremendous heterogeneity in how different European countries interpret and implement it. We 
argue that this diversity in GCR interpretation and implementation is one important reason for the 
current lack of political progress that we are witnessing. We then identify the major source areas 
of the current crisis and resulting migrations (section 3) by documenting the sharp increases in 
asylum applications to EU member states from 2009 onwards, and its unequal distribution across 
EU member states.  
In section 4, we use data from the 2008 wave of the EU Labour Force Survey to profile the 
economic integration of past refugee migrants to EU countries. In particular, we show that 
migrants who arrived for humanitarian reasons were less likely to be employed than economic 
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migrants from the same origin areas despite similar levels of education. This evidence from past 
refugee movements underscores the particular challenges to host countries and indicates the need 
for more proactive policies to prevent the poor economic outcomes of refugees.  
We then examine the economics of refugee migrations by first contrasting refugee migration with 
economic migration (section 5). We argue that whereas the latter is a choice for all parties involved, 
refugee migrants are forced to leave their home country because of threats to their own lives or 
those of their family, and countries that receive refugees do so for humanitarian not economic 
reasons. Further, host countries tend not to have economic integration of the refugee migrants as 
their primary objective. Receiving countries can decide whether to reject asylum claims, grant full 
GCR refugee status (which often leads to permanent settlement in the host country), or offer 
temporary forms of humanitarian support. These different options, by creating different degrees of 
permanence for individual refugees, greatly affect their incentives to integrate socially and 
contribute economically. We suggest that clear rules and support mechanisms are needed early on 
in the migration history, together with fast processing times, fast access to the labour market, and 
active integration programs. We conclude section 5 by highlighting the economic advantages of 
increased coordination in the asylum process across countries; for instance, at the EU level. Such 
increased coordination would reduce the free-rider problem inherent in the provision of (the public 
good of) refugee status, minimize the costs of providing asylum to a given number of refugees, 
and alleviate countries’ incentives to implement policies aimed at deterring asylum applications, 
which may harm refugee integration.  
We finally discuss the implications of earlier evidence for optimal and feasible refugee policies 
that Europe should implement not simply to address the current crisis but also to deal with future 
migration developments.  
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2. Who is a refugee? 
2.1 The international framework 
Modern refugee legislation has its origins in the aftermath of World War II and in the refugee 
crises of the preceding interwar years. Grounded in Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other 
countries, the United Nations Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (GCR) was 
adopted in 1951. In its first article, the convention defines the refugee as follows:  
[any person who] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
The GCR not only broadly defines the rights of refugees and the obligations of hosting states but 
establishes the principle of non-refoulement (article 33), which prevents host countries from 
returning refugees against their will to any territory in which they fear a threat to life or freedom1. 
Although the convention was originally limited to persons fleeing events occurring within Europe 
and before January 1, 1951, the 1967 Protocol removed these limitations and endowed the GCR 
with universal coverage. As of April 2015, 145 states have signed the 1951 Convention and 142 
have signed both the Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 
Being the only global legal instruments that explicitly regulate refugee rights, the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol still define the international framework regulating asylum policy. 
                                                 
1 “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion” (Geneva Convention, article 33.1). 
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Nevertheless, being based on the concept of individual persecution, the GCR definition of refugees 
does not specifically address the more general issue of civilians fleeing wars and conflicts. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), however, considers that persons 
fleeing the civil wars and ethnic, tribal, and religious violence and whose country of origin is 
unwilling or unable to protect them should be considered refugees even if they are fleeing a general 
rather than an individual threat.  Hence, some regional human rights treaties have since expanded 
the GRC definition to include these people.2 On the other hand, some countries, particularly in 
Western Europe, argue that civilians fleeing conflicts should not be granted full refugee status. As 
a result, they have developed different forms of temporary/subsidiary humanitarian protection for 
these people. These alternative hosting schemes have been used in Europe to respond to sudden 
and massive influxes of war-displaced individuals (e.g., from the 1990’s conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia and Kosovo). In these cases, each civilian belonging to a certain group is considered a 
refugee prima facie (i.e., in the absence of evidence to the contrary), eliminating the need for 
individual status determination. Such group determination permits speedy admittance to safe 
countries but with no guarantee of permanent asylum.  
At the same time, because the GCR does not stipulate how receiving countries should determine 
whether an individual meets the criteria for refugee status, each signatory country employs its own 
procedures for status recognition, with many (especially in the developing world) still lacking any 
formalized system.3 Similarly, although the GCR clearly states the rights and entitlements of 
                                                 
2 For instance, the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) adopted the “Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa” in 1969 while the Organization of American States signed the 
“Cartagena Declaration on Refugees” in 1984. In both cases, the 1951 GCR definition was expanded to include those 
compelled to leave their country owing to such threats as external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or 
generalized violence. 
3 Turkey, for instance, did not establish a legal framework for asylum and create an agency responsible for assessing 
asylum applications until 2013. Syrian refugees, however, are managed outside this system and benefit from a group-
based temporary protection scheme. 
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refugees – access to courts (art. 16), labour market (art. 17–19), housing (art. 21), public education 
(art. 22), and so forth – it limits the enjoyment of these benefits to “refugees lawfully staying” in 
the host country territory (and thus not to current and rejected asylum seekers). It also uses overly 
broad formulations (e.g. “treatment as favourable as possible”), which leave much room for host 
state interpretation. Not surprisingly, such breadth has resulted in disparities as the different 
governments adapt their asylum laws to their own resources, refugee migration histories, and 
political and national security concerns (see section 2.4).  
2.2  From displacement to refugee status 
In Figure 1, we reconstruct the progression from displacement from region of residence to eventual 
recognition as a refugee in a third country. Those who flee their homes are technically defined as 
“displaced persons”, reflecting their displacement by such traumatic events as violence, conflict, 
or natural disaster, and are classified by the UNHCR as their “population of concern”. These 
individuals may be divided into those who are “internally displaced” (IDPs) – that is, forced to 
leave their homes but still residing in the country of origin – and those who have moved to a third 
country. These latter can be further divided into those who have moved to a neighbouring country 
(“first asylum country”) and those who have managed (either legally or illegally) to reach a country 
that accepts asylum applications and offers GCR refugee status or other forms of humanitarian 
protection (“final destination” country). Obviously, these three outcomes can also represent 
consecutive steps in the same process.  
In general, displaced persons in neighbouring countries are hosted in refugee camps but, not being 
subject to a formal status determination process, do not usually have recognized refugee status. 
UNHCR defines these individuals as being in a “refugee-like” situation, as belonging to “groups 
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of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar 
to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been 
ascertained” (UNHCR, 2015). In fact, “first asylum” countries receiving inflows of displaced 
persons are often developing countries that do not – and usually cannot afford to – have any formal 
system in place to manage and assess asylum applications. Displaced people in refugee camps are 
thus often subsidized by UNHCR, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international aid 
and can remain in that situation for years. For these persons, UNHCR operates “resettlement 
schemes” that transfer refugees from one host country to another that has agreed to admit them 
and ultimately grant them permanent settlement. Candidates for resettlement undergo a formal 
refugee status determination process while still in the origin or first asylum country, after which 
successful candidates are relocated to the destination countries. A major advantage of the 
resettlement schemes is that displaced people do not need to engage in dangerous and illegal trips 
in order to find a safe haven abroad.  Currently, however, only a relatively small number of states 
participate in the UNHCR resettlement program, with the U.S. being the world’s top resettlement 
country, followed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian countries. 
Only a relatively small fraction of the total displaced population manages to reach a country that 
has a formal system of refugee status recognition (see also Hatton, 2009). These arrivals are usually 
unauthorized border crossings using forged documents and/or the help of smugglers. Once arrived 
in the host country, displaced persons have the right to apply for asylum and reside in the host 
country until a decision is made. The process outcome can either be recognition of full Geneva 
refugee status, the offer of some form of temporary humanitarian protection, or a rejection. 
Rejected asylum seekers have to either leave the host country autonomously or be returned to their 
home country. For many, however, the principle of non-refoulement applies, preventing the host 
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country from expelling these individuals but leaving them with an undefined status (which often 
leads to undocumented residency). In general, return to the home country, although not represented 
in Figure 1, is an option at all stages of the process.  
In its own records, UNHCR counts as refugees all individuals residing in a third country who are 
in a refugee-like situation, who enjoy formally recognized refugee status (under the GCR, 1967 
Protocol, or any of the regional conventions on asylum), or who have been granted complementary 
and temporary forms of protection (UNHCR, 2015).  Hence, throughout the remainder of the 
paper, we adopt their broad definition of refugees but distinguish individuals with refugee-like 
status from those with recognized refugee status whenever needed. 
2.3 Displaced population, refugees and asylum seekers: evidence from UNHCR data 
Table 1 provides an overview of the worldwide population of displaced individuals. The table 
shows that, as of 2015, most of the almost 59 million displaced individuals worldwide were still 
residing within the borders of their home countries; only 30.7% had left their country to become 
refugees abroad. For European (2.7 million) and South American (7.8 million) displaced persons, 
this share is 25.7 and 8%, respectively, but for the 19 million Africans and 29 million Asians 
displaced by conflict or violence, it reaches 31.6 and 36.5%, respectively. It is also worth noting 
that, as the bottom panel of Table 1 shows, most of these international movements involve 
neighbouring countries located on the same continent. For instance, in 2015, almost 82% of 
African refugees were residing in another African country, while the corresponding values for 
Asian, European, and South American refugees were 81, 94, and 54%, respectively. Europe as a 
whole was, in 2015, hosting 15% of the world’s refugees. 
Figure 2 plots the time series of world refugee population (in millions) by continent of origin.  The 
stock of refugees has been large over the entire 1980–2015 period. Nevertheless, large differences 
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exist between continents, with refugee populations originating mostly from Asia and Africa 
dwarfing refugee populations from South America and Europe, including those induced by the 
Balkan wars. The figure also illustrates two notable peaks in the total refugee population, one in 
the early 1990s and the other in the 2010s, with a further rapid surge in the most recent years. The 
first peak, when the total refugee population reached 15 million people, was related to the Balkan 
wars and to conflicts in Africa (Rwanda, Somalia) and Asia (Iraq, Afghanistan). The second peak, 
starting around 2008, corresponds to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to the consequences 
of the Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa. The 2014-2015 surge is mostly explained by the 
Syrian civil war. The graph further shows that in 2015, Asian citizens accounted for more than 9.5 
million refugees and African refugees for over 5 million, with the remaining million equally split 
between European and South American refugees.  
In Figure 3 we report the total number of asylum applications (in millions) worldwide in each year 
between 2000 and 2015, distinguishing again by continent of origin. From a global figure of over  
0.5 million asylum applications per year in the 2001-2002, this number declined to approximately 
0.3 million per year between 2004 and 2010 and then began increasing sharply. In 2015, more than 
2 million asylum applications were filed worldwide, a clearly unprecedented number given the 
just over 850,000 that made up the 1992 peak (Hatton, 2016). In 2015, the majority of asylum 
seekers originated from Asia (due especially to Syrian and Afghan asylum seekers), which 
accounted for almost 1.6 million applications. 
In Table 2, we draw on the latest available UNHCR figures, updated to December 2015, to show 
the estimated number of Syrian citizens at different stages of the process that goes from 
displacement to being recognized as refugee. Of a total population of almost 22 million people (in 
2011), almost 12 million of Syrian citizens (54%) are currently displaced by the conflict. Slightly 
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more than half of them (6.6 million) are still in Syria, being internally displaced. Just 1.5% (180 
thousand) have been offered resettlement or resettled to a safe host country. The remaining 43.2% 
(5.1 million) have autonomously reached a third country. The vast majority of this latter group 
(89%; 4.6 million) is hosted under a refugee-like status in a neighbouring country: 2.5 million in 
Turkey, 1 million in Lebanon, 630 thousand in Jordan, 240 thousand in Iraq, and 120 thousand in 
Egypt. About half a million Syrians have reached an EU country and were granted asylum or are 
waiting for their asylum claim to processed: 40% of them are hosted in Germany (200 thousand), 
followed by Sweden (100), Austria (30) the Netherlands (30) and Hungary (20).  
As for the case of Syrian citizens, UNHCR resettlement schemes still account for a relatively minor 
fraction of the refugee flows. The UNHCR estimated that over 1.1 million of refugees are globally 
in need of resettlement in 2016 (UNHCR, 2015b). The latest records show that 26 countries 
admitted a total of 105,200 resettled refugees in 2014, leading to a total of 900 thousand 
resettlements over the last decade (UNHCR, 2015). The United States are by far the major recipient 
of resettled refugees. In 2014, US admitted 73 thousand refugees (70% of the total), followed by 
Canada (12%), Australia (11%), Sweden (2%), Norway and Finland (1% each). 
2.4  Asylum policy in Europe 
2.4.1  Towards a common European policy 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the gradual fall of the Iron Curtain triggered massive across-
state movements that particularly affected Western European countries. The collapse of former 
Yugoslavia and the conflicts that tore apart the region for almost a decade generated additional 
flows of people seeking asylum. These large refugee inflows across Europe created a need to re-
think asylum policies in all European countries. They also generated a shift towards a higher degree 
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of coordination at the EU level. For example, since the 1990 adoption of the Dublin Convention, 
the EU has tried to develop a common European asylum system with the principal aim of clarifying 
which receiving country is responsible for asylum claims and preventing multiple application 
submissions in member states. The convention itself, which came into force in 1997–1998, 
established the principle that the member state through which the asylum seeker first entered the 
EU is responsible for assessing the asylum claim. To ensure effective application of the 
convention, in 2000, the EU approved the EURODAC Regulation, which established a common 
asylum fingerprint database. Between 1999 and 2005, several additional legislative measures were 
implemented to harmonize common minimum standards for asylum. In 2000, for instance, the 
European Refugee Fund (ERF) was created to share the costs of reception, integration and 
voluntary repatriation of people in need of international protection.  The ERF was endowed with 
€630 million over the period 2008-13 (105 million per year), In 2014, the ERF was replaced by 
the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which has a budget of  €3.137 billion for the 
seven years 2014-2020, or €448 million per year.4  It is worth noting, that the resources targeted 
to these funds are relatively small when compared to other EU funds. For instance, the European 
Social Fund (ESF) receives a funding of €10 billion a year,5 and the  European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development (EAFRD) has been endowed with €100 billion over the seven years 2014-
2020, or €14.2 billion per year.6 
Yet despite these persistent attempts to establish a single and harmonized European asylum policy, 
individual member states have de facto maintained full sovereignty over the implementation of 
their national asylum policies. In addition, as highlighted by the current refugee crisis, the 
                                                 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/index_en.htm  
5 http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=35&langId=en 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rural-development-2014-2020/index_en.htm 
13 
 
European common policy on asylum is riddled with weaknesses. One notable example is the so-
called EU “refugee relocation system” based on a September 2015 EU agreement to relocate 160 
thousand refugees from Italy and Greece to other European countries over a period of two years. 
Because several countries voted against the scheme and refused to participate, as of 15 September 
2016, only 9% (14,478) of the promised 160,000 places have been made available by some of the 
participating countries and less than 5% (4,890) of the refugees have actually been relocated.7  
2.4.2  Heterogeneity in asylum policies across Europe 
The different exposures to refugee inflows (see section 3.3) and the lack of an effective European-
level mechanism to “spread the burden” of hosting refugee populations, led many countries to 
implement procedures aimed at reducing inflows into their territories. One such strategy is to 
tighten visa requirements and border enforcement to reduce the number of asylum seekers that 
manage to reach the territory and apply for refugee status. Another is to vary the efficiency of 
application assessment and/or become stricter about granting protection to applicants. 
Governments can also decide whether to grant full GCR refugee status or to offer subsidiary forms 
of humanitarian protection. They can also greatly impact the treatment given to asylum seekers 
and refugees by regulating and limiting their access to such advantages as benefit entitlements, the 
labour market, and choice of residence. In this section, we document this heterogeneity using both 
UNHCR data and a summary of national legislative differences. 
UNHCR data (see Data Appendix A.1) permit the construction of informative indicators of 
the efficiency and “generosity” of national asylum policies. First, because governments may try to 
discourage potential refugees by under-investing in the staff and resources for screening – thereby 
                                                 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-
material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf, accessed on 19 September 2016. 
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prolonging wait times and increasing outcome uncertainty – we use share of applications evaluated 
over total submitted each year to compare the speed and efficiency of application processing in 
different countries. We illustrate the pace of processing applications in Figure 4, whose vertical 
axis reports the yearly average of the application shares processed in EU15+NOR+CHE countries 
over the 2000–2014 period. This share varies from a minimum of 37% in Greece to a maximum 
of 73% in the UK, with an overall average of approximately 57%. These numbers imply that it 
takes Greece an average of almost 3 years to process all applications received in any given year, 
while the UK takes less than 1.5 years. The figure also suggests that the pace of application 
processing is not mechanically determined by the number of applications received (per 10,000 
population), which are reported on the horizontal axis. In fact, the numbers of applications 
processed each year in the three countries that have received the largest inflows of applicants 
(relative to population) in the last 15 years – Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland – are close to, or 
even above, the European average. On the other hand, among the three countries that received the 
smallest inflows, Portugal and Italy have processing times close to the European average (both 
around 60%) while Spain only manages to assess 47% of its yearly application inflow. While some 
of the cross-country variations in processing time could be due to differences in the composition 
of asylum applications,8 the absence of a correlation between processing time and number of 
applications received suggests that countries can choose their own application processing pace and 
that those receiving larger inflows probably invest more resources in their screening processes.  
Figure 5 demonstrates that European countries also differ widely in their asylum generosity, 
which we measure here as the “total recognition rate”, the number of positive decisions to grant 
                                                 
8 Some countries, for instance, may systematically receive more applications from a group of potential refugees that 
are inherently harder to evaluate, slowing down the screening process.  
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some form of humanitarian protection (GCR refugee status or other subsidiary protection) over the 
total number of applications processed. On average, only about 10% of applications submitted in 
EU15+NOR+CHE countries between 2000 and 2014 led to recognition of refugee status. This 
share, however, varies from as little as 2% in Greece to approximately 18% in Denmark. 
Nevertheless, the figure shows a positive correlation (fitted line) between yearly shares of 
applications processed and recognition rates: countries that are more efficient in screening 
applications tend also to be more generous in offering refugee status.9 This positive slope suggests 
that European countries that are faster in screening applications are not achieving this target simply 
by rejecting more applicants. On the contrary, countries like Belgium, France, Denmark, and the 
UK seem to combine a relatively high degree of both efficiency and generosity.  
As discussed in section 2.1, national governments maintain a substantial degree of discretion in 
deciding upon the exact status to be granted to asylum applicants. Using UNHCR statistical data, 
we can measure the “Geneva refugee recognition rate” as the share of applicants accorded full 
GCR refugee status over the total granted some form of humanitarian protection. Table 3 reports 
the total number of asylum applications approved by each country in 2014, together with the share 
of individuals approved for full GCR status. In 2014, 204,092 asylum applications were approved 
in EEA countries, the vast majority in a Western European country. Of these, 58% were given full 
GCR refugee status, while the others received only subsidiary protection. There is, however, 
considerable heterogeneity in the frequency of refugee status across countries: whereas Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Spain, for instance, granted GCR status to less than 25% of total successful 
applicants, this share was around 80% in Austria, Belgium, and Germany and 91% in the UK. 
                                                 
9 Austria and Germany appear as outliers in this graph, having relatively high recognition rates but also relatively 
long processing times. 
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These differences, although possibly indicative of different interpretations of the common legal 
framework, may also be due to differences in the type of applications received. For this reason, in 
columns 3–4 and 5–6 of the table, we focus on Syrian and Afghan refugees, respectively. Once 
again, we observe substantial heterogeneity in the treatment of refugees from the same origin 
countries, with Syrians more likely to receive full GCR status than Afghans in almost all receiving 
countries. Nevertheless, even though in countries like the UK (97%) and Austria (91%), almost all 
Syrian refugees are given full Geneva status, this share is as low as 10% in large destination 
countries like Sweden. The GCR status recognition rate for Afghan refugees similarly varies from 
85% in the UK to 10% in Italy.  
National asylum policies can also vary along many other dimensions, a few examples of which we 
summarize in Table 4 at different stages of the process.10 National governments can, for example, 
employ lists of “safe countries of origin” to accelerate asylum application screening, which in the 
case of EU member states means all other member states (plus Switzerland and Norway) as safe 
countries of origin. In general, to qualify as a safe third country, a nation must implement the GCR 
and offer potential refugees the opportunity to apply for asylum.11 Yet only eight EU countries – 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK – have adopted 
official lists of safe origin countries outside the EU, and even these lists vary widely in both number 
and countries included. For example, whereas Ireland’s list contains only one country (South 
                                                 
10 The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE; http://www.ecre.org/) recently created an Asylum 
Information Database (AIDA) containing information on asylum procedures, reception conditions, and detention 
across 16 EU member states. This database provides a clear picture of the current heterogeneity in policies across 
these states and is one of the main sources used here. 
11 In a highly controversial decision, Norway’s parliament agreed in November 2015 to amend the Immigration Act, 
removing the requirement that a country accept and process asylum applications to be considered a safe third country. 
This change implies that Russia can be deemed safe to receive asylum seekers and allows Norway to forcedly deport 
asylum seekers entering through the Artic border with Russia (the “artic route”). In similar manner, a March 2016 EU 
agreement with Turkey implies that Greece can consider Turkey a safe country, allowing Greece to transfer asylum 
seekers from its territory to Turkey’s.  
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Africa), the UK’s includes 26 countries. Of these, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (MKD) are considered safe by all list adopters except Ireland. 
Albania (ALB) and Montenegro (MNE) are considered safe by all but Germany and Ireland, and 
Kosovo (RKS) is deemed safe by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the UK, but not 
by France, Germany, or Ireland. A related concept, central to the Dublin Convention, is the “safe 
third country”, a construct used to justify the rejection of applications from asylum seekers who 
transited through a safe country (where they could have applied for asylum) and subsequent forced 
return to that country. 
All EU countries tend to impose restrictions on asylum seekers’ labour market access, a constraint 
intended to reduce incentives for economic migrants to submit (unfounded) asylum applications. 
In general, asylum seekers are prevented from being (legally) employed for a minimum period that 
should theoretically correspond to the time required to process their claims. According to EU 
Directive 2013/33, member states must ensure that asylum seekers access the labour market no 
later than 9 months after they apply for protection. This ban, however, is for only 1 month in 
Portugal; 3 months in Austria, Finland, and Germany, 6 months in Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, 
and Spain, but one year in France and the UK.  
Over the last few decades, European countries have also experimented with asylum seeker 
dispersal policies aimed generally at distributing the inflows of potential refugees across different 
regions of the receiving countries, usually away from major cities. Sweden, for example, 
introduced an “all-of-Sweden” policy in 1984 that remained compulsory until 1994 (Edin et al., 
2003). Denmark similarly implemented a dispersal policy between 1986 and 1998 (Damm, 2009), 
and in 1987 and 1994, respectively, the Netherlands and Norway introduced dispersal policies that 
still remain in place today. The UK and Ireland also continue to disperse asylum seekers under 
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policies introduced in 2000 (Bell et al., 2013). At the same time, according to AIDA12 survey data, 
only Belgium, Italy, and Ireland fully guarantee asylum seekers adequate access to health care: in 
all other countries, they enjoy only limited access.   
3. The current European refugee crisis 
3.1 Entry routes 
According to Frontex, which records detected attempts since 2009, over 2.6 million illegal 
migration attempts were detected at European borders between 2009 and 2015, with 1.8 million in 
2015 alone.13 Frontex distinguishes nine routes of entry into Europe: (1) the central Mediterranean 
route (i.e. flows from North Africa towards Italy and Malta through the Mediterranean Sea); (2) 
the circular route from Albania to Greece; (3) the eastern border route (i.e., the 6,000 km long land 
border between Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the EU’s eastern member 
states); (4 & 5) the Eastern Mediterranean sea and land routes (i.e.  crossing through Turkey to the 
EU via Greece, southern Bulgaria, or Cyprus); (6) the Western African route (mainly from Senegal 
and Mauritania to the Canary Islands); (7 & 8) the western Mediterranean sea and land routes 
(from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula); and (9) the Western Balkan route (i.e. flows from the 
Western Balkan countries themselves and crossings through the Bulgarian-Turkish or Greek-
Turkish borders directed towards Hungary).  
Figure 6 outlines the numbers of illegal border crossings recorded by Frontex over time while also 
highlighting the share of crossings through each of the three routes that have become the most 
important in the current crisis: the Central Mediterranean route, the Eastern Mediterranean sea 
                                                 
12 The European Council on Refugees’ Asylum Information Database (AIDA). 
13 Illegal crossings are defined as “the number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities when 
entering or attempting to enter illegally the territory between border crossing points at external borders”. See Data 
Appendix A.2 for a discussion of the limitations of these data. 
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route, and the Western Balkan route. The number of attempted illegal crossings rose dramatically 
between 2014 and 2015. The share of total crossings along the Central Mediterranean route was 
especially large in 2014 (about 60% of total crossings), while the Eastern Mediterranean sea and 
Western Balkan routes together accounted for 90% of illegal crossing attempts in 2015. 
3.2 Source countries 
As regards origin country, over the entire 2009–2015 period, Syrian citizens, at about 38% of the 
total, constituted the largest group attempting illegal crossings, with the over 500 thousand 
Afghans making up an additional 20% (see panel A, Table 5)14. Iraqis, Pakistanis, Albanians, and 
Eritreans each accounted for 4 to 5% of total crossings, while those coming from Kosovo, Somalia, 
Nigeria, and Bangladesh made up about 2%. As illustrated by the ratio of illegal crossing attempts 
in 2015 to those in 2009 (column 4), over the 7 years covered by our data, the relative magnitude 
of inflows from each of these countries varied drastically, and total illegal crossing attempts grew 
17 fold. Nonetheless, expansions were not equally distributed across countries; for instance, 
unauthorized migration attempts from Syria accelerated dramatically from barely any in 2009 to 
1.4 thousand times the number in 2015. Conversely, the number of illegal crossings attempted by 
Albanian citizens in 2015 was only one third of its 2009 size.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows that, between 2009 and 2015, over 3.5 million asylum applications were 
submitted in Europe, with the number increasing nearly fivefold over the period. The top 10 
countries of origin for asylum applicants largely overlap with those of illegal crossers, with 9 out 
of 10 countries being in both lists. Syria and Afghanistan particularly, the two countries that 
account for the greatest number of attempted illegal border crossings, are also the top two countries 
                                                 
14 Because information on origin country is unavailable for 14% of total crossings in Q3 2015 and 48% of total 
crossings in Q4 2015, for these two quarters, we impute unknown nationalities based on the route-specific origin 
country composition in the previous quarter. 
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of origin for asylum applicants and were responsible for the largest increase in asylum applications 
(by a factor of 77 and 8, respectively). The exceptions are Russia, which is only present among 
countries of origin for asylum applicants, and Bangladesh, which is not among the top ten countries 
of origin of asylum applicants.  
3.3 Destinations 
As already emphasized, not all European countries (EU28 + NOR + CHE) have been equally 
affected by the refugee crisis. As Table 6 shows, between 2009 and 2015, Western European 
countries received the largest share (3.1 million) of the total 3.5 million asylum applications 
(almost 70 per 10,000 population) received by all European countries.15 These aggregate figures, 
however, conceal the true heterogeneity of refugee populations across Western European 
countries. As Table 6 shows, over the 2009–2015 period, the top 5 recipients of asylum 
applications were Germany (902 thousand; 110.1 per 10,000 pop.), Sweden (414 thousand; 446.9 
per 10,000 pop.), France (390 thousand; 60.5 per 10,000 pop.), Italy (256 thousand, 43.5 per 
10,000 pop), and Hungary (244 thousand; 243.8 per 10,000 pop.).  
Figure 7 illustrates the relation between the total asylum applications received by each country 
between 2009 and 2015 (vertical axis) and its population of individuals with refugee status in 2009 
(horizontal axis). The straight line is the equality line. The figure shows that the vast majority of 
European countries - with the only exception being the UK - lie above the equality line, implying 
that the number of applications received over the 2009–2015 period was larger than the 
accumulated stock of refugees hosted in 2009. The scatter plot further reveals that countries that 
                                                 
15 Note that the figures refer to the number of applications, not the number of individuals filing an application. Since 
individuals may be filing multiple applications, the number of applications is an upper bound for the actual size of the 
flow of asylum seekers over the period. 
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started with a larger population of refugees in 2009 attracted more asylum applicants in the 
following years.  
As a matter of fact, the burden imposed on Europe by this inflow of asylum seekers is small 
compared to that placed on countries closer to the refugees’ countries of origin. This difference is 
clearly demonstrated in Table 7, which reports refugee stocks and their ratios to 10,000 population 
in both selected EU countries and Syria’s neighbouring countries in 2014 (the last year for which 
complete data are available for all countries). At that time, Lebanon, a country with a population 
of 4.5 million, was hosting 1.16 million refugees, or about 2,554 individuals in search of 
humanitarian protection per 10,000 population. Likewise, Jordan was home to more than 1,000 
refugees per 10,000 population, while Turkey was hosting nearly 1.7 million or 221 per 10,000 
population. By comparison, Sweden, the EU country with the highest population of individuals 
with full GCR or subsidiary status relative to its size, was hosting 206 asylum seekers or 
individuals with refugee status per 10,000 population. The ratio for Norway and Switzerland was 
just above 100 per 10,000 population, and for Germany and France, it was only 55 and 47, 
respectively.  
4. Refugee labour market integration 
4.1 Evidence from past refugee waves 
To assess how well past refugees to EU countries have integrated into the labour market compared 
to economic immigrants from the same area of origin we draw on the 2008 wave of the European 
Labour Force Survey (EULFS) that allows us to differentiate between economic and refugee 
migrants.16 We focus on individuals in working age (between 25 and 64 years old), not in full 
                                                 
16 At the time this paper was written, this is the only available wave in the EULFS that provides that type of 
information. 
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education or military service, and define “refugees” the migrants who report “international 
protection” as the reason for migration (see Data Appendix A.3 for details).  
Table 8 gives an initial overview of the socio-economic characteristics of refugees compared to 
those of natives and economic immigrants from EU15 and non-EU15 countries. The refugees are 
61% male, versus 47% for economic immigrants, and 43.9 years old on average, which is slightly 
older than economic immigrants but under a year younger than natives. They are on average 
somewhat less educated than natives and economic immigrants from EU15 countries, but they are 
better educated than economic immigrants from non-EU15 countries. 
 To evaluate how refugee employment rates compare with those of economic immigrants and 
natives, in Figure 8, we graph unconditional and conditional (on age, gender and educational 
attainment) employment rate differentials between natives and, respectively, EU15 economic 
immigrants, non-EU15 economic immigrants, and refugees overall.17 Although all immigrant 
types have lower employment probabilities than natives, both conditionally and unconditionally, 
the employment gaps are larger for non-EU15 immigrants than for EU15 immigrants (3.2 vs. 7.2 
percentage points unconditional on socio-economic characteristics) and increase to 16.1 
percentage points for refugees. Conditional employment gaps are even larger, reflecting the fact 
that refugees are disproportionately male and young, both of which characteristics are positively 
associated with a likelihood of employment. Figure 9 provides more detail on how the 
(conditional) immigrant-native and refugee-native employment gaps differ by area of origin.18 
                                                 
17 The estimates are from LPM regressions of an indicator equal to one if the individual is employed (or self-employed) 
on refugee, EU15 immigrant, and non-EU15 immigrant dummies, a set of individual controls, and country of residence 
fixed effects. These estimates are reported in Appendix Table A1. We focus our analysis of refugees’ economic 
integration on employment status because wage data are not available in EULFS data. 
18 The estimates are from LPM regressions of an indicator equal to one if the individual is employed (or self-employed) 
on refugee and immigrant dummies, a set of individual controls, and country fixed effect, with separate regressions 
estimated for each area of origin. Information about the country of origin is not available. These estimates are reported 
in Appendix Table A2. 
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Whereas refugees and economic immigrants from European countries outside EU15 (NMS12 and 
Other European in the Figure) show similar conditional employment gaps to natives, refugees from 
North Africa, the Middle East, or other African and Asian countries are considerably less likely to 
be employed than economic immigrants from the same areas of origin. Employment gaps are 
largest for the group of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East, at 32.5 percentage points. 
To assess how quickly refugees integrate into their host countries vis-à-vis economic immigrants, 
in Figure 10 we plot the conditional refugee-native and immigrant-native employment rate 
differentials against years since arrival. As expected, the employment probabilities of both 
refugees and economic immigrants increase with years in the country; however, the increase is far 
steeper for refugees. During the first 3 years of arrival, refugees are 50 percentage points less likely 
to be employed than natives, a large gap that may be explainable by the legal restrictions on labour 
market participation frequently in place during the application processing period. This refugee-
native employment gap declines by about half 7 to 10 years after arrival, turns statistically 
insignificant 15 to 19 years after arrival, and eventually approaches zero 25 years after arrival. 
While the figure suggests that employment prospects of refugees improve more rapidly than those 
of immigrants with time in the country, it is important to bear in mind that the figure is based on 
one cross-section only, precluding us from separating the effects of years since arrival from 
possible compositional changes across cohorts. This catch-up of refugees is in line with evidence 
presented by Aiyar et al (2016) who, similar to us, focus on Europe as a whole. Luik et al. (2016) 
and Cortes (2004) document a similar catch-up of refugees in Sweden and the US. Bratsberg et al. 
24 
 
(2014, 2016), in contrast, paint a more negative picture in the case of Norway, highlighting that 
refugees become increasingly dependent on social insurance transfers.19 
Table 9 highlights that the lower employment probabilities of refugees versus immigrants cannot 
be accounted for by differences in area of origin or years since arrival.20 Conditional on individual 
characteristics and destination country fixed effects, refugees are 10.9 percentage points less likely 
to be employed than economic (non-EU15) immigrants. This gap decreases only slightly to 0.095 
percentage points when area of origin fixed effects and years since arrival are included as 
additional regressors. Compositional differences in terms of years since arrival and areas of origin 
are therefore responsible for only a relatively small portion (13%) of the observed employment 
gap between refugees and non-EU15 immigrants. 
Figure 11 further reveals that the refugee-native employment gaps (conditional on individual 
characteristics) vary widely across destination countries, much more so than the economic 
immigrant-native employment gaps. The two countries with the largest refugee-native 
employment gaps are Ireland and the UK (with 46 and 29 percentage points, respectively), both 
nations in which economic immigrants do particularly well21. Countries with a relatively large 
refugee share, such as Sweden, Germany, and Austria, take a middle position with employment 
                                                 
19 Bevelander and Pendakur (2014) find that in Canada refugees, especially women, tend to be more successful than 
family reunion immigrants.  
20 In column (1), we regress the employment indicator on an indicator for being a refugee, an indicator for being 
foreign-born (which equals 1 for both immigrants and refugees, and 0 for natives) as well as on individual 
characteristics and country of residence fixed effects. We then include a full set of interactions between the foreign-
born indicator and indicators denoting years since arrival (column 2), between the foreign-born indicator and 
indicators of area of origin (column 3), and between the foreign-born indicator and indicators of both years since 
arrival and area of origin ones (column 4). In this specification, the coefficient on the refugee indicator refers the mean 
difference in the employment probabilities of refugees and non-EU15 immigrants within each year since arrival (in 
column 2), within each area of origin (in column 3) or both (in column 4). 
21 Despite such heterogeneity, estimates from the pooled sample of all countries are not driven by any single 
country. Table A3 reports estimates from pooled regressions where we drop at a time each of the countries in our 
sample. The immigrant and refugee coefficients remain highly significant and are of similar magnitude across all 
specifications.   
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gaps of 23, 17 and 9 percentage points respectively. Finally, employment gaps between natives 
and both refugees and economic immigrants are small in Cyprus and Greece, as well as in Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal, all countries with relatively low shares of refugees.   
4.2 Outlook: The current refugee crisis 
How well current refugees will integrate into the labor market is extremely difficult to forecast for 
at least two reasons. First, comprehensive and representative data on the skill structure and 
employability of those currently applying for asylum, or of those whose application was approved 
no more than 2 years ago, does not yet exist. Second, their labor market outcomes depend on which 
policies, integration support, and incentive structures are implemented.  
As Figure 9 shows, existing refugee populations in EU member states who arrived many years 
before the current crisis, but who are from the same areas as the major share of current asylum 
seekers (i.e., North Africa and the Middle East), are considerably less likely to be employed than 
refugees from other areas, even conditional on their educational background.  
A recent survey by the German Ministry for Immigration and Refugees conducted in 2014, which 
focuses on individuals given official refugee status who initially applied for asylum in Germany 
between 2007 and 2012 and thus arrived at the onset of the crisis, further indicates that refugees 
from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan are less educated than refugees who arrived in previous waves. 
Specifically, as Table 10 shows, 16.1% of Syrian and 25.9% of Iraqi refugees have never attended 
school, and only 4.3 and 3.5% have attended school for at least 15 years (which is comparable to 
tertiary education in Table 8). The table further shows that only 38.9% of Iraqi and 24.7% of Syrian 
refugees are employed (of which roughly one third are employed only marginally for under 10 
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hours a week), while one fifth to one quarter are looking for work (see Worbs and Bund, 2016, for 
more details).  
Focusing on refugees who applied for asylum in Germany in 2015, a survey conducted by the 
German Ministry for Immigration and Refugees at the time of registration paints a somewhat more 
optimistic picture and puts the share of asylum applicants with tertiary education at 17% and the 
share of applicants who never attended school at 8%. These numbers may, however, not be fully 
representative as only 70% of asylum applicants agreed to participate in the survey. 
5. The economics of refugee migration 
We begin our discussion on the economics of refugee migration by highlighting the important 
differences between refugee and economic migrants (section 5.1). We then discuss the trade-offs 
and policy options faced by single countries (section 5.2) before outlining the economic 
advantages of coordinated decisions between countries; for example, at the EU level (section 5.3).   
5.1 Refugee vs economic migrants 
Economic migrants are, at least conceptually, fundamentally different from refugee migrants in 
that the former not only choose whether or not to migrate but also decide, based on the constraints 
set by receiving countries, which country to migrate to given the economic benefits of this 
decision. Refugee migrants, in contrast, are forced to leave their origin countries, often due to 
unforeseen and sudden events that put their lives at risk. Their migration decisions, therefore, are 
generally neither deliberate nor planned, and less based on economic considerations. Their arrival 
in a host country is often dictated by contingency, after perilous and unpredictable journeys. 
Similarly, receiving countries typically choose economic migrants based on economic 
considerations (e.g. labour market shortages) and they can set clear migration terms, such as stay 
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duration and migrant qualifications. In the case of refugee migration, however, countries are 
fulfilling their obligations as GCR signatories, and the decision to grant asylum seekers official 
refugee status is primarily based on humanitarian considerations. As such, receiving countries may 
have relatively little influence on the type of refugees they host. Refugee migrations are therefore 
closer to “forced marriage” than the “chosen match” typical in economic migrations and the 
relation between the two parties, migrant and destination country, is different from what would 
have evolved if all decisions had been taken on purely economic grounds. This is not to say that 
the forced marriage is necessarily inferior to the optimally chosen match for both parties. On the 
contrary, forced emigration may well mean that destination countries are able to attract migrants 
with qualifications and economic potential that they might otherwise not have enticed to settle in 
their countries.22 Cases also exist, however, of less well-endowed refugee populations where the 
economic benefit to the receiving country is less clear – see our discussion in the previous section.  
5.2 Country-specific policies and tradeoffs  
5.2.1 Permanent settlement or temporary protection? 
Even though destination countries have limited control over the number and type of displaced 
migrants arriving in their territory, they can decide whether to grant full GCR refugee status or 
offer subsidiary forms of humanitarian protection that require refugees to repatriate once the 
conflict or migration trigger has been eliminated. For instance, whereas in the 1990s, most 
destination countries opted for some form of temporary protection for the refugee waves from 
Bosnia and Kosovo, the choices made during the current refugee crisis differ widely (see Table 3). 
                                                 
22 Historical incidences of the gains to countries giving refuge to persecuted populations include the 17th century re-
population and boost to the textile industry in war-torn Prussia induced by Huguenots fleeing religious persecution 
in France (see Hornung, 2014) and the major contributions to science and technology in the US made by highly 
educated Jews fleeing Nazi Germany (see e.g., Moser, Voena, and Waldinger, 2014). 
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Many of the former Yugoslavia refugees returned to their home country once the conflict ended. 
For example, of the 345,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina residing in Germany in 1996, 
260,000 had voluntarily returned by December 2000, while 5,500 were deported against their will 
(Rühl and Lederer, 2001). In the current crisis, not only is there considerably more uncertainty 
about whether and when the primary impetuses for asylum seeking will abate, but current refugees 
are culturally more distinct than the Balkan refugees and, based on initial evidence, may also be 
less educated (see section 4.2). 
Two primary reasons for the poor success in integrating refugees into the host countries’ labour 
markets are the long decision time for asylum claims and the indecisiveness of host nations about 
duration and permanence of stay. Both factors contribute to considerable delays in giving 
individuals a clear perspective on their future residence in the host country. This lack of clear 
timeframe speaks to the key insight from early dynamic models of human capital (e.g., Ben-Porath, 
1967) that the longer the pay-off period for skill investment, the more individuals invest, which is 
why full time schooling takes place at the start rather than in the middle or towards the end of an 
individuals’ life cycle. Applied to migrants, because the type of human capital that is productive 
differs across nations, migrants must learn new skills that make them productive in their new 
country of residence. One such skill is knowledge of the local language, whose acquisition is very 
costly but of dubious value in the origin country. Consequently, as emphasized by Dustmann 
(1993, 1999, 2000), whether and how much a migrant chooses to invest into country-specific 
human capital depends greatly on the migrant’s perception of the likelihood of future settlement 
in the host country. Being unclear about the chances of permanent stay creates disincentives for 
investment into the types of skills that are productive in the new country, affecting the refugees’ 
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earnings and career paths and leading them to perform below their economic potential.23 Lack of 
clarity about the possibility of permanent settlement thus obstructs attempts to use such schemes 
to train refugees. Even if permanent residence is guaranteed but only after a prolonged period in 
the host country, such investment may no longer seem optimal because of the reduced pay-off 
period.  Adda et al. (2016) find strong support for this hypothesis, by estimating a dynamic model 
of return migration and human capital accumulation, and simulating the effects of lack of clarity 
about permanence at the start of an individual’s migration cycle on lifetime earnings and human 
capital investments.  
These observations have important consequences for the politics of refugee migration. Above all, 
policies aimed at fostering labour market integration and optimizing migrants’ economic 
contribution need to recognize that these individuals will only undertake costly investments in host 
country-specific human capital if they are likely to pay off over the life cycle. Moreover, because 
certification requirements and the transferability of certain aspects of such capital differ across 
countries, any such policies need to be carefully adapted to the particularities of the host country.24 
As a result of the above circumstances, refugees who are initially offered only temporary 
protection but end up staying for long periods may have lower employment probabilities and lower 
earnings than refugees offered permanent settlement from the start. This observation calls for 
                                                 
23 For example, Germany’s comprehensive system of skill certifications obtained through 2–3 year trade 
apprenticeships is costly because remuneration during the long training period is far lower than the wage in an 
equivalent unskilled job (see Dustmann and Schoenberg, 2012, for details). Moreover, the certification, although 
valuable in Germany, may be worth little in the refugee’s country of origin. Consequently, even young refugees are 
likely to be reluctant to undertake prolonged and costly training within the apprenticeship system unless they see their 
future in the Germany. 
24 For instance, whereas certificates are an essential part of German workers’ careers, such is less the case for UK 
workers. On the other hand, English may be more valuable in the home country than German. All else being equal, 
both these aspects support the economic integration of refugees into the UK rather than Germany. 
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shorter periods for deciding asylum claims25 and for policies that provide clear host country 
commitment on residence duration. Such policies should be combined with carefully designed 
active integration programs for those who obtain full refugee status or permanent residency.26 The 
refugees’ own investments could be further incentivised by making economic success in the labour 
market a pre-condition or contingency in the selection for permanent residence. In fact, Germany 
adopted such a policy in the 1990s for refugees from Bosnia and Kosovo (see, e.g., Rühl, and 
Lederer, 2001; Rühl, Neske, and Currle, 2004).  
5.2.2 Where should refugees be allocated? 
In addition to choosing between permanent and temporary protection, destination countries must 
decide on refugee location, which economic efficiency dictates should be in areas with the lowest 
hosting costs but highest chances of integration into the labour market. Such areas tend to be urban 
areas already containing immigrants from the refugees’ own country, who can then serve as a 
support network and actively help their newly arrived compatriots to find decent-paying jobs (Edin 
et al, 2003; Damm, 2009). For the same reasons, refugees also typically prefer areas with a larger 
concentration of their own nationals, meaning that allowing refugees free choice over where to 
locate within the destination country may lead to superior labour market outcomes.  
Another important consideration is the political costs of refugee allocation. Recent research by 
Dustmann et al. (2016) suggests that the political costs may likewise be smaller in urban than in 
rural areas: they find that the inflow of refugee migrants increases the support for right-wing anti-
                                                 
25 Hainmueller et al. (2016) provide evidence that the length of time that refugees wait for a decision on their asylum 
claim affects their subsequent economic integration. 
26 Couttenier et al. (2016) provide evidence that integration policies, including swift access to the labour market, can 
mitigate immigrants’ likelihood to commit a crime. 
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immigration parties in rural areas, but not urban areas. On the other hand, housing costs are 
typically considerably higher in urban than in rural areas.  
5.3 Economic advantages of coordinated decisions between countries 
Increased coordination between countries – for example, at the EU level – could have several 
economic benefits for receiving countries that are separately discussed below. 
Refugee status as a public good. Offering refugee status is a public good in that if one country 
offers asylum to those escaping individual persecution or civil war, residents in other countries 
benefit from knowing that these individuals are safe. However, the fact that the costs of hosting 
the refugees are borne entirely by the country providing asylum leads to an under-provision of the 
public good when countries make such decisions individually. Coordination between countries 
would make it possible to internalize the externalities that countries impose on each other, allowing 
the social optimum to be reached (see Hatton and Williamson (2006) and Hatton (2004, 2015), for 
a formal analysis).27 
Dynamically consistent decisions. A lack of coordination may induce countries to make decisions 
that are not dynamically consistent. For example, governments may deter applications for asylum 
by adopting specific policies, such as limiting asylum seekers’ access to the labour or housing 
markets, implementing an especially lengthy application process, or failing to provide an active 
integration program for successful applicants. These polices, as previously pointed out, can 
increase a destination country’s cost of refugee hosting by hindering the integration of successful 
                                                 
27 Facchini et al.(2006) develop a political-economy model to study the process through which countries determine 
their asylum policies. They show that coordination is desirable, but allowing for cross-country transfers toward 
countries that receive larger numbers of asylum seekers may lead to a welfare inferior outcome because the possibility 
of compensation exacerbates strategic delegation effects.  
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applicants. If, however, countries cooperate, they no longer have any incentive to adopt such 
harmful policies.  
Allocating a given number of refugees at the lowest possible cost. As shown by Fernández-
Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015a, 2015b), cooperation across nations makes it possible to 
allocate a given number of refugees at minimum costs while simultaneously ensuring that the 
burden (or responsibility) of providing refuge is shared by all countries. Supposing that countries 
have not only agreed on the total number of refugees to be admitted but also on a refugee quota 
system (based, e.g., on country population size and GDP),28 then, ignoring for the moment any 
match effects whereby certain types of refugees can best integrate in a particular country, these 
countries will differ with respect to their (marginal) costs of providing refuge. Here, we interpret 
“costs” in the broad sense, reflecting not only monetary costs but also the country’s general 
willingness to welcome refugees. A market in which countries are allowed to trade refugee quotas 
will secure the allocation of refugees across countries at minimum costs. To illustrate this consider 
two countries, A and B, that initially agree to accept 1,000 refugees each. If the cost of hosting an 
additional refugee is €20,000 for country A but only €10,000 for country B, then there is room for 
trade. For example, country B might admit an additional refugee if paid at least €10,000, while 
country A might be willing to pay up to €20,000 for not having to provide refuge to the 1,000th 
refugee. The gains from the trade will be exhausted once the marginal costs of hosting an additional 
refugee are equalized between the two countries, resulting in a refugee allocation that minimizes 
the costs of granting asylum and allows both countries to contribute to the costs according to a 
prearranged quota.29 As argued by Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015b), this 
                                                 
28 Several such quota systems have been proposed in the past; see, for example, Fernandez-Huertas Moraga and 
Rapoport (2015a) for an overview. 
29 It should be noted that only a market mechanism can induce countries to truthfully reveal their costs of hosting 
refugees: when countries implement quotas dependent on costs, they have an incentive to overstate them.  
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mechanism may be augmented by a matching algorithm that allows refugees to state their 
preferences for country of residence so as to realize match-specific gains between refugee and host 
country. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of the existing regulatory frameworks for 
refugee migration, the magnitudes and types of refugee movements, and the economics and politics 
of the current refugee crisis. In particular, we identify strong differences in the way EU countries 
interpret their obligations as signatories of the Geneva Convention for Refugees (GCR) and outline 
previous (mostly unsuccessful) attempts to enhance coordination at the EU level. We also 
demonstrate that although asylum claims in the EU are currently at an all-time high (1.5 million in 
2015), applications are far from equally distributed across EU countries, and only about 10% 
submitted to EU15 countries (plus Norway and Switzerland) between 2000 and 2014 were 
successful. We further document that previous waves of refugee migrants have been less 
successful in integrating into European labour markets than economic migrants from the same 
origin areas. We also offer tentative evidence that the labour market outcomes of the current waves 
of refugees will be similarly problematic unless better integration mechanisms are implemented.  
In our view, the above evidence calls for a strong, coordinated policy response to the current crisis, 
which has imposed on Europe the tremendous costs of large-scale movements of people who arrive 
unexpectedly and are – given current regulations and their common interpretations – hard to 
control using conventional border protection means. These movements pose an enormous 
challenge to European countries and to the fundaments of the EU as a whole. Not only their 
economic costs but also their political costs threaten to create rifts between countries and furnish 
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a welcome vehicle for populist movements to enhance their vote shares.30 The current crisis further 
demonstrates that the Dublin Convention is unworkable, as amply illustrated by Europe’s 
unpreparedness for the number of refugees that have arrived at its southern borders. At the same 
time, the burden on EU countries of large inflows of refugees has been unequally distributed, and 
ex-post re-allocation schemes to share this burden more equally have been impossible to 
implement. Moreover, many of those who arrived in European member states over the past decade 
have migrated for economic reasons rather than because of valid claims under the GCR. Hence, 
only a fraction is likely to attain some type of refugee status (see Figure 5), which adds the problem 
of deporting unsuccessful asylum applicants.  
Despite the challenges to coordinate policies, there is a drastic need for a new regulatory 
framework agreeable to all member states that addresses the current and future challenges of 
refugee migration and replaces dated coordination attempts like the Dublin Convention with a 
more workable alternative. Such a framework should be based on two pillars: a coordinated policy 
that secures Europe’s outer borders and deals with asylum claims before refugees have (illegally) 
crossed into mainland Europe, and an allocation mechanism that more equitably distributes the 
burden of refugee migrations across countries yet is flexible enough to account for national 
particularities and political circumstances. 
On the first, a coordinated refugee policy should implement measures for deciding asylum claims 
at the outer borders of the EU before refugees enter the EU mainland. Such measures would need 
EU countries to agree in principle on exactly what constitutes a valid refugee claim. In practice, 
they would also require the establishment of facilities able to deal with large numbers of refugees 
                                                 
30 See e.g. Dustmann et al. (2016) for evidence. 
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at the outskirts of the EU, and of EU courts that decide within weeks on claims according to agreed 
rules and interpretations of the GCR. On the second, once some form of refugee status has been 
granted, the refugee needs then to be allocated to a European country, possibly with the help of 
tradable refugee quotas, combined with ex-ante agreed allocation mechanisms that could take into 
account refugees’ preferences, and seek to reduce the economic and political costs of refugee 
hosting. EU-level coordination that reduces the costs of refugee hosting could benefit all EU 
countries, not only those currently hosting the lion’s share of asylum seekers. Such a system, if 
successfully implemented, would also deter potential migrants with no humanitarian reasons, and 
thereby reduce future flows, possibly quite radically.  
Admittedly, establishing such a policy and its corresponding structures would be tremendously 
challenging. However, continued lack of ex-ante coordination and absence of agreed EU-wide 
rules when dealing with future challenges may be far more costly. The demographic developments 
in Africa and the Middle East, and the potential for conflict in these regions suggest that there will 
be similar challenges in the future. Canning et al. (2015), in a World Bank report, estimate that the 
population of Africa, Europe’s southern neighbor, will increase to 2.8 billion over the next 45 
years, from 1.11 billion in 2013. Similar projections are provided by a recent (2015) UN report on 
the World Population,31 which identifies Africa as the continent with the fastest growing 
populations over the next decades, while Europe’s populations are shrinking. This, in combination 
with sluggish economic development, climate change, unstable political leadership, and possibly 
continued conflict, will lead to increased migration pressures on Europe.32 Among the 20 countries 
ranked highest according to the 2016 Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace (used by the 
                                                 
31 https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/World_Population_2015_Wallchart.pdf 
32 Climate change induced phenomena such as desertification and scarcity of food is considered by some as possible 
future driver of large flows of “climate refugees”, especially from the Sahel region of Africa (see 
http://time.com/4024210/climate-change-migrants/).  
36 
 
OECD in their Report on States of Fragility),33 17 are located either in Africa (14) or in the Middle 
East (3), and often overlap with countries with the highest population growth. Europe’s economic 
and political future will be severely affected on how it manages future movements instigated by 
conflict, persecution and deprivation. The current crisis is a wake-up call to develop the necessary 
institutions and implement needed coordination to be prepared for future challenges.34 
The current crisis calls also for foreign policies that are more responsible. The recent and ongoing 
conflicts in the Middle East are a main reason for the humanitarian disaster and the ensuing refugee 
flows we have witnessed over the past years. Responsibility for interventions and policies that may 
have contributed to the current situation lies also with European countries.35 To prevent refugee 
movements in the future, European foreign policy should learn from past experiences, and be 
aimed at avoiding conflict and instability.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1:  From displacement to refugee status 
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Figure 2: Evolution of refugee populations by origin continent (1980–2015) 
 Note. The figure reports the evolution of the stock of refugees (in millions) by continent of origin, and overall, between 
1980 and 2015. Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Annual number of asylum applications by origin continent (2000–2015) 
 Note. The figure reports the annual number of asylum applications (in millions) by continent of origin, and overall, 
between 2000 and 2015. Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data. 
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Figure 4: Share of asylum applications cleared and applications received in EU15, Norway, 
and Switzerland (yearly averages for 2000–2014) 
 Note. The table plots the share of applications cleared against the applications received for EU15 countries, Norway 
and Switzerland. Numbers are yearly averages for the 2000 -2014 period. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
UNHCR data. 
 
Figure 5: Refugee status recognition rates and share of asylum applications cleared in EU15, 
Norway, and Switzerland (yearly average for 2000–2014) 
 Note. The figure plots the total recognition rate against the share of applications cleared for EU15 countries, Norway 
and Switzerland. Numbers refer to yearly averages for the 2000-2014 period. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
UNHCR data. 
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Figure 6: Illegal border crossings in Europe by route (2009–2015) 
 Note. The solid line and right axis represent the annual number of detected illegal border crossings (in millions) into 
the EU between 1980 and 2015; the vertical bars report the share of total crossings in each year detected on the Western 
Balkan route (red), Eastern Mediterranean sea route (green), Central Mediterranean route (yellow) and other routes 
(blue).  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Frontex data. 
 
 
Figure 7: Total asylum applications received between 2009 and 2015 and refugee 
population in 2009 by host country 
 Note. The horizontal axis displays the 2009 stock of individuals with refugee status (full or subsidiary) per 10,000 
population for all EU countries (plus Norway and Switzerland); the vertical axis shows the cumulated number of 
asylum applications between 2009 and 2015 per 10,000 population. The straight line is the equality line above which 
countries were receiving a higher number of applications than their 2009 refugee stock.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data. 
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Figure 8: Refugee-native and immigrant-native employment gaps 
 Note. The figure shows the unconditional and conditional differences in employment probabilities between EU15 and 
non-EU15 economic immigrants and natives, as well as between refugees and natives obtained using linear probability 
models. All regressions include host country fixed effects. Conditional employment gaps control for gender, age 
(dummy variables for 5-year age groups) and education (dummy variables for lower secondary and tertiary education). 
The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64 not in full-time education or military service. We also 
report 90 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EULFS 2008 data.  
 
Figure 9: Employment gaps by area of origin 
 Note. The figure displays the differences in employment probabilities between economic immigrants and natives and 
between refugees and natives by area of origin obtained using linear probability models estimated separately for each 
origin area. The regressions control for gender, age (dummy variables for5-year age groups), education (dummy 
variables for lower secondary and tertiary education), and host country fixed effects. We also report 90 percent 
confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64 not 
in full-time education or military service but excludes economic immigrants from EU15 countries. NMS12 includes 
all countries that entered the EU in 2004 and 2007: Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EULFS 2008.   
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Figure 10: Employment gaps by years since arrival 
 Note. The figure displays gaps (together with 90 percent confidence intervals) in the employment probabilities of 
economic immigrants versus natives and refugees versus natives by years since arrival obtained from linear probability 
models that condition on gender, age (dummy variables for 5-year age groups), education (dummy variables for lower 
secondary and tertiary education), and host country fixed effects. The sample includes individuals aged between 25 
and 64 not in full-time education or military service. 
 
Figure 11: Employment rate differentials by host country 
 Note. The figure plots employment rate differentials (and 90 percent confidence intervals) between economic 
immigrants and natives as well as between refugee migrants and natives separately by host country, obtained from 
linear probability models estimated separately for each country that condition on gender, age (dummy variables for 5-
year age groups), education (dummy variables for lower secondary and tertiary education). Due to the low number of 
refugees in some countries, Italy, Spain and Portugal (It_Es_Pt) are grouped together, as are Cyprus and Greece 
(Cy_Gr). The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64 not in full-time education or military service.
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Tables 
Table 1: Origin and destination of UNHCR’s population of concern (year 2015) 
 Note. The table reports, separately for each origin and for the world as a whole, the stock of the overall UNCHR population of concern (row 1), the stock of refugees 
(including asylum seekers, row 2) and the stock of asylum seekers (row 3). All figures are expressed in thousands. Row 4 reports the share of refugees (including 
asylum seekers) in the total UNHCR population of concern. The bottom rows report the distribution of refugees (including asylum seekers) from each origin 
continent across destination continents. 
 
 
 
 
 
Africa Asia Europe
South 
America
World
UNHCR population of concern (thous.) 19,124 29,423 2,672 7,765 58,991
Refugees (thous.) 6,050 10,753 686 625 18,122
    of which are asylum seekers (thous.) 659 1,146 179 177 2,162
Share of refugees 0.316 0.365 0.257 0.080 0.307
Refugees distribution across destinations
Africa 0.819 0.026 0.000 0.289
Asia 0.056 0.813 0.003 0.000 0.501
Europe 0.101 0.129 0.937 0.028 0.147
North America 0.019 0.025 0.057 0.430 0.039
Oceania 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.004
South America 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.541 0.020
Total 1 1 1 1 1
Continent of origin
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Table 2: Different stages of becoming a refugee: The case of Syrians 
 
  
Note. The table reports the total Syrian population, the number of internally displaced Syrians, the number of Syrian citizens offered Resettlement to a safe host 
country (the figure includes both confirmed pledges and individuals actually resettled) and those hosted in neighbouring countries and in the EU (including both 
asylum seekers and individuals with recognized refugee status). Source: Own calculations based on UNHCR Population Statistics data. 
Millions %
21.96
Not displaced 10.10 46.0
Displaced: 11.86 54.0
of which: Internally displaced 6.56 55.3
Offered Resettlement (as of Apr 2016) 0.18 1.5
Refugees/Asylumseekers at 31/12/2015: 5.12 43.2
of which: in Neighboring countries (as of 31/12/2015): 4.56 89.0
of which: Turkey 2.50 54.9
Lebanon 1.06 23.3
Jordan 0.63 13.8
Iraq 0.24 5.4
Egypt 0.12 2.6
in EU28 +NOR +CH 0.49 9.6
of which: Germany 0.20 40.8
Sweden 0.10 20.8
Austria 0.03 6.8
Netherlands 0.03 6.5
Hungary 0.02 3.9
Total population (pre‐conflict)
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Table 3: Total number of approved asylum applications and share with full Geneva refugee 
status by host country 
 Note. For each EU host country, the table reports the number of asylum applications approved and the share of 
applications granted full refugee status in 2014 according to the Geneva Convention for all origin countries and then 
separately for Syrians and Afghans. For countries whose application process has more than one level (e.g., first review, 
appeal), the numbers for all levels are summed. Source: 2014 UNHCR Statistical Year Book. 
 
refugee 
status 
granted
Share 
with full 
Geneva 
status
refugee 
status 
granted
Share 
with full 
Geneva 
status
refugee 
status 
granted
Share 
with full 
Geneva 
status
Austria 11,351 0.769 3,653 0.913 1,534 0.576
Belgium 8,479 0.810 1,705 0.740 1,269 0.638
Bulgaria 7,000 0.737 6,406 0.753 24 0.292
Croatia 26 0.615
Cyprus 1,243 0.073 926 0.000
Czech Rep. 376 0.218 71 0.000
Denmark 5,670 0.689 4,002 0.782 128 0.188
Estonia 20 1.000
Finland 1,346 0.372 96 0.365 119 0.202
France 21,093 0.789 1,468 0.640 712 0.431
Germany 40,563 0.821 23,859 0.860 3,403 0.595
Greece 3,852 0.539 718 0.735 827 0.440
Hungary 476 0.504 171 0.643 75 0.227
Ireland 504 1.000
Italy 20,582 0.177 313 0.732 2,398 0.106
Latvia 23 0.130
Lithuania 91 0.264
Luxembourg 197 0.802
Malta 1,478 0.158 366 0.016
Netherlands 13,250 0.207 5,439 0.064 415 0.439
Norway 5,076 0.754 1,294 0.444 317 0.577
Poland 450 0.593 132 0.871
Portugal 109 0.165
Romania 753 0.503 467 0.385 51 0.627
Slovakia 113 0.124
Slovenia 44 0.773
Spain 1,583 0.241 1,162 0.105
Sweden 32,347 0.331 16,404 0.107 1,765 0.405
Switzerland 14,123 0.439 2,821 0.325 1,855 0.156
United Kingdom 11,874 0.906 1,423 0.976 713 0.851
EU15 + NOR + CHE 191,999 0.578 64,357 0.545 15,455 0.431
EU28 + NOR + CHE 204,092 0.576 72,896 0.553 15,605 0.431
Host Country
All origin countries Syria Afghanistan
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Table 4: Examples of heterogeneity in asylum policies across European countries 
 Note. The table reports selected aspects of the asylum policies of Western EU host countries. Column 1 reports the list of origin countries considered safe (* = safe 
only for males); column 2 summarizes information on whether and for how long asylum seekers are denied access to the labour market while decisions on their 
applications are pending; column 3 documents whether and for how long a dispersal policy is or has been in place; and column 4 describes whether or not asylum 
seekers have effective access to health care. 
Asylum seekers: 
effective access to the 
health care
# countries countries: Maximum duration of the prohibition
in 
place
in the 
past duration:
Austria yes
9 + EEA 
Countries/ 
Switzerland
ALB, BIH, MKD, RKS, MNE, 
SRB, CAN, AUS, NZL Yes 3 months no no With Limitations
Belgium yes 7 ALB, BIH, MKD,RKS, MNE, SRB, IND Yes 6 months no no Yes
Denmark yes 14 + EFTA Countries
ALB, BIH, MKD, RKS, MNE, 
SRB, MDA, RUS, CAN, USA, 
MNG, AUS, JPN, NZL
- - no yes 1986-1998 -
Finland no Yes
3 months (valid travel document 
holder) and 6 months (no valid 
travel document)
no no -
France yes 16
ALB, ARM, BEN, BIH, CPV, 
GEO, GHA, IND, MKD, MUS, 
MDA, MNG, MNE, SEN, SRB, 
TZA
Yes 12 months no no With Limitations
Germany yes 5 BIH, MKD, SRB,GHA, SEN Yes 3 months no no With Limitations
Greece no No Immediate no no With Limitations
Ireland yes 1 ZAF No yes 2000 - (…) Yes
Italy no Yes 6 months no no Yes
Luxembourg yes 12
ALB, BEN*, BIH, CPV, HRV, 
MKD, GHA*, RKS, MNE, SEN, 
SRB, UKR
Yes 9 months no no
Netherlands no Yes 6 months yes 1987- (…) With Limitations
Norway no Yes Undefined yes 1994 - (…)
Portugal no Yes 1 month no no
Spain no Yes 6 months no no
Sweden no No Immediate no no 1984-1994 With Limitations
United Kingdom yes 26
ALB, BIH, MKD, RKS, MNE, 
SRB, MDA, UKR, GMB*, 
GHA*, KEN*, LBR*, MWI*, 
MLI, MUS*, NGA, ZAF, SLE*, 
BOL, BRA, ECU*, JAM, PER, 
IND, MNG, KOR
Yes 12 months yes 2000 - (…) With Limitations
Dispersal policyList of safe countries of origin Asylum seekers: denied access to the labour market
50 
 
Table 5: Illegal border crossings and asylum applications in Europe, 2009–2015 
 Note. Panel A reports, for Europe as a whole, the number of detected illegal crossings of European borders between 
2009 and 2015 separately for each of the 10 main origin countries, the share of nationals from each origin country 
among total illegal crossings and the ratio of detected crossings in 2015 to detected crossings in 2009. Panel B reports 
separately for each of the 10 main origin countries the number of asylum applications filed in Europe (EU 
28+NOR+CH) between 2009 and 2015 and the share of nationals from each origin country among total asylum 
applications and the ratio of applications in 2015 to applications in 2009.  
Sources: Panel A: Author elaboration of Frontex data. Panel B: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data. 
Origin
Detected 
attempts
Share of 
total 
attempts
Ratio 
2015/2009
Syria 992,864 37.7% 1,431
Afghanistan 529,595 20.1% 29
Iraq 134,029 5.1% 29
Pakistan 131,350 5.0% 61
Albania 111,660 4.2% 0.3
Eritrea 95,687 3.6% 19
Kosovo 57,544 2.2% 36
Somalia 54,451 2.1% 2.1
Nigeria 48,491 1.8% 14
Bangladesh 44,331 1.7% 48
Total 2,633,896 17
Origin Applications
Share of 
total 
applications
Ratio 
2015/2009
Syria 595,869 16.9% 77.33
Afghanistan 360,542 10.2% 8.10
Serbia and Kosovo 271,235 7.7% 4.57
Iraq 214,471 6.1% 6.51
Eritrea 151,754 4.3% 4.95
Russian Federation 145,634 4.1% 0.94
Pakistan 143,284 4.1% 4.77
Somalia 126,815 3.6% 1.00
Nigeria 108,889 3.1% 2.51
Albania 107,817 3.1% 32.91
Total 3,522,378 4.74
Panel A: Illegal crossings to Europe, 2009‐2015
Panel B: Asylum applications in Europe, 2009‐2015
51 
 
Table 6: Total asylum applications in Europe between 2009 and 2015 by host country 
 Note. The table reports for each EU host country (plus Norway and Switzerland) the total number and the number per 
10,000 population of asylum applications received between 2009 and 2015 (in thousands).  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data. 
 
thousands per 10,000 pop
Germany 902.7 110.1
Sweden 413.6 446.9
France 389.5 60.5
Italy 256.7 43.5
Hungary 244.5 243.8
United Kingdom 204.1 32.9
Austria 186.9 224.2
Switzerland 151.7 196.9
Belgium 147.2 136.9
Netherlands 127.4 77.3
Norway 98.7 205.7
Greece 73.1 65.8
Denmark 61.2 111.1
Poland 60.9 16.0
Finland 53.6 100.7
Bulgaria 41.3 55.3
Spain 34.2 7.4
Cyprus 14.0 175.5
Ireland 11.7 25.8
Malta 11.3 274.7
Romania 9.6 4.7
Luxembourg 9.1 184.7
Czech Republic 4.8 4.6
Croatia 3.8 8.7
Slovak Republic 2.8 5.3
Lithuania 2.3 7.1
Portugal 2.2 2.1
Slovenia 1.5 7.5
Latvia 1.4 6.4
Estonia 0.5 3.7
EU15 + NOR + CHE 3123.7 76.5
EU28 + NOR + CHE 3522.4 68.5
Host Country
Tot Asylum Application 2009‐2015
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Table 7: Refugees and asylum seekers as a share of the population, 2014 
 Note. Panel A reports the total number of refugees, the country’s population, and the number of refugees per 10.000 
population in selected Middle Eastern countries in 2014. Panel B displays the total number of individuals with full 
GCR or subsidiary refugee status, the total number of asylum applications, the country’s population, and the number 
of individuals with refugee status plus asylum seekers per 10,000 population in selected European countries in 2014. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data. 
 
Table 8: Basic characteristics of refugee population (EUFLS 2008) 
 Note. The table compares socio-economic characteristics of refugee migrants (who entered the country because of 
international protection), economic migrants from EU15 and non-EU15 countries, and natives. The sample includes 
all individuals aged between 25 and 64, not in education or military service. Source: EULFS 2008. 
  
Refugees
Country 
population
Refugees per 
10.000 population
Lebanon 1,161,439 4,546,774 2,554
Jordan 672,862 6,607,000 1,018
Turkey 1,693,686 76,667,864 221
Iraq 279,585 34,812,326 80
Stock of 
individuals 
with refugee 
status (full or 
subsidiary)
Asylum 
seekers
Country 
population
individuals with 
refugee status + 
asylum seekers 
per 10.000 
population
Sweden 142,152 56,717 9,644,864 206
Norway 46,980 7,094 5,107,970 106
Switzerland 62,566 20,762 8,139,631 102
France 252,228 55,814 65,889,148 47
Denmark 17,737 4,245 5,627,235 39
Germany 216,921 226,116 80,767,463 55
United Kingdom 117,093 36,294 64,351,155 24
Italy 93,662 45,675 60,782,668 23
Panel A: Middle Eastern Countries
Panel B: EU Countries (plus Norway and Switzerland)
Refugees
Immigrants 
non‐EU15
Immigrants 
EU15
Natives
Share of males 0.61 0.47 0.47 0.50
Mean age 43.9 41.2 42.6 44.7
Share with Lower‐secondary education  0.38 0.44 0.27 0.32
Share with Tertiary education 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.26
Number of observations 2,554 440,59433370
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Table 9 - Refugee-Immigrant (non-EU15) employment gap 
 
 
Note. We regress the usual employment indicator on an indicator for refugee, a foreign-born one (which equals 1 for 
both immigrants and refugees, and 0 for natives) as well as the usual individual characteristics (age dummies, gender, 
education dummies) and country of residence fixed effects. We then, from column 2 onward include the refugee 
indicator and a full set of interactions between the foreign-born indicator and years since arrival ones (column 2), 
between the foreign-born indicator and area of origin ones (column 3), and between the foreign-born indicator and 
both years and area of origin ones (column 4). With such a specification the coefficient on refugee (reported in the 
table) delivers the mean difference between employment probability of refugees and non-EU15 immigrants within 
each value of year since arrival (in column 2) and within each area of origin (in column 3) or within both (in column 
4). Sample: individuals aged between 25 and 64, not in education or military service. Immigrants from EU15 or North 
America are excluded. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Educational attainment and employment probabilities of recent refugees in 
Germany 
 Note. The table summarizes the results of 2014 German Ministry for Immigration and Refugees survey, which focused 
on individuals who obtained official refugee status and initially applied for asylum in Germany between 2007 and 
2012. 
 
 
 
 
none employed in training
Afghanistan 18.3 27.8 48.9 2.8 29.1 20.7 19.9 16.3
Iraq 25.9 41.4 25.7 3.5 38.9 21.5 26 6
Syria 16.1 35.5 41.5 4.3 24.7 26.4 27.8 6.9
N 2,403 2,805
school attendance labor market participation
up to 9 
years
10‐14 
years
at least 15 
years 
looking for 
work
out of the 
labor force
Baseline
Conditional 
on years 
since arrival
Conditional 
on area of 
origin
Conditional 
on both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee‐Immigrant gap ‐0.109*** ‐0.121*** ‐0.083*** ‐0.095***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Years since arrival FE X X
Area of origin FE X X
Observations 468,404 468,404 468,404 468,404
R‐squared 0.216 0.216 0.217 0.218
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Data Appendix  
 
A.1 Asylum applications and refugee status recognitions 
The annual information on UNHCR’s population of concern and asylum application processing 
are taken from the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, which classifies persons of 
concern as follows: (a) refugees, individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and/or the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; individuals recognised in accordance with the UNHCR 
Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection or enjoying temporary protection; 
and, since 2007, individuals in a refugee-like situation; (b) asylum seekers, individuals who have 
sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined; 
(c) returned refugees, former refugees who have returned to their country of origin but are yet to 
be fully integrated; (d) internally displaced persons (IDPs), individuals who have been forced to 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, 
armed conflict, and who have not crossed an international border; (e) returned IDPs, IDPs who 
were beneficiaries of UNHCR's protection and assistance activities and who returned to their areas 
of origin or habitual residence during the year; (f) stateless persons; (g) other individuals of 
concern, those who do not fall directly into any of the previous groups but to whom UNHCR 
extends its protection and/or assistance services. The data on asylum application processing 
include the numbers of applications submitted, pending applications at the beginning and end of 
the year, applications recognized, applications rejected, and applications otherwise closed. Data 
are reported bilaterally for all world countries. As of the time of writing, the data, which are 
available on line, had been updated to December 31, 2014. 
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UNHCR also provides a monthly data set of asylum applications lodged in 38 European and 6 
non-European countries between 1999 and 2015. Where possible, our figures exclude repeat/re-
opened asylum applications and applications lodged on appeal or with courts.  
A.2 Illegal crossings  
Quarterly data on illegal entries by route and origin country for each quarter from Q1 2009 to Q4 
2015 were obtained from Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, which began 
gathering such information in 2009. Frontex defines illegal crossings as “the number of third-
country nationals detected by Member State authorities when entering or attempting to enter 
illegally the territory between border crossing points at external borders”. The recorded number of 
illegal crossings may differ from the actual flows of undocumented immigrants for at least two 
reasons: First, not all illegal crossings are detected, meaning that detected crossings are a lower 
bound for actual unauthorized crossings. Illegal crossings are determined by the combination of 
the number of people who attempt an illegal entry and the level of enforcement. Any variation in 
the number of detected crossings, therefore, can be due to variations both in the underlying flow 
of people and in the border enforcement intensity. This complicates comparisons over time and 
across routes of recorded crossings. A second issue is that multiple entry attempts by the same 
migrant are re-counted, leading to an over-estimation of the number of individuals attempting to 
cross the border illegally. Nonetheless, in the absence of reliable information on the size of these 
two effects, detected illegal crossings are the best available proxy for undocumented migratory 
pressure.  
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The data set distinguishes between the following nine routes: the Central Mediterranean route, the 
circular route from Albania to Greece, the eastern border route, the Eastern Mediterranean routes 
(sea and land), the West African route, the Western Mediterranean routes (sea and land), and the 
Western Balkan route.  
A.3 Labour market outcomes of refugee and economic migrants  
Our analysis is based on the 2008 wave of the European Labour Force Survey (EULFS), which is 
conducted in the 27 Member States of the European Union and two countries of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). It is a large quarterly household sample survey of people aged 15 and 
over, as well as of persons outside the labour force. The National Statistical Institute of each 
member country is responsible for selecting the sample, preparing the questionnaires, conducting 
the direct interviews among households, and forwarding the results to Eurostat in accordance with 
the common coding scheme.  
In certain countries, the 2008 survey included an ad-hoc module that asked for information on 
reason for migration, thereby allowing us to identify refugees versus other (economic) migrants. 
We therefore focus our analysis on the countries in which this ad-hoc module was administered: 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, and the UK. The reason-for-migration question was asked to all non-native 
individuals who arrived in the country of residence when they were over 16 years of age36. The 
2008 interviewees were asked to choose among 8 options: (1) employment, intra-corporate 
transfer; (2) employment, job found before migrating; (3) employment, no job found before 
migrating; (4) study; (5) international protection; (6) accompanying family/family reunification; 
                                                 
36 Non-native individuals (immigrants and refugees) are defined as “foreign born” in all countries except Germany 
where they are defined as “foreign nationals”. 
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(7) family formation, and (8) other. We assign the label refugee to all those who selected option 5, 
international protection, and the label economic migrant to all those choosing any of the other 
reasons. The sample for our empirical analysis includes individuals of working age (between 25 
and 64 years old), not in full-time education or military service. After dropping all observations 
with missing data on education, reason for migration, or area of origin, we have an estimation 
sample of 476,518 individuals, of whom 440,594 are natives, 33,370 are economic immigrants, 
and 2,554 are refugees.  
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Appendix Tables 
  
Table A1: Refugee-native and immigrant-native employment rate differentials 
 Note. The table reports differences in employment probabilities between economic immigrants/refugees relative to 
natives (columns 1–3) and between EU15/non-EU15 immigrants/refugees relative to natives (columns 4–6) estimated 
using linear probability models. The mean of the outcome variable is equal to 0.73. The sample includes all individuals 
aged between 25 and 64, not in full-time education or military service. All regressions control for gender (dummy for 
male), age (dummies for 5-year age groups), education (dummies for lower secondary and tertiary education), and 
host country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A2: Employment rate differentials by origin area  
 Note. The table reports differences in employment probabilities between economic immigrants/refugees and natives 
estimated separately (using linear probability models) for different origin areas. The sample includes all individuals 
aged between 25 and 64, not in full-time education or military service. Economic immigrants from EU15 countries 
are excluded. All regressions control for gender, age (dummy variables for 5-year age groups), education (dummy 
variables for lower secondary and tertiary education), and host country fixed effects. We also report tests for the 
equality of coefficients for economic immigrants versus refugees. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Immigrant ‐0.059*** ‐0.085*** ‐0.070***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Refugee ‐0.161*** ‐0.216*** ‐0.183*** ‐0.161*** ‐0.215*** ‐0.183***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Immigrant_EU15 ‐0.032*** ‐0.041*** ‐0.043***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Immigrant_nonEU15 ‐0.072*** ‐0.105*** ‐0.082***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Gender and age X X X X
Education X X
Observations 476,518 476,518 476,518 476,518 476,518 476,518
R‐squared 0.02 0.18 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.22
NMS12
Other 
Europe
Other 
Africa
South & 
East Asia
N.Africa & 
Middle 
East
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrant ‐0.031*** ‐0.083*** ‐0.034*** ‐0.101*** ‐0.182***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Refugee ‐0.056 ‐0.083*** ‐0.224*** ‐0.234*** ‐0.325***
(0.056) (0.027) (0.036) (0.041) (0.033)
Observations 445,719 447,643 443,300 444,664 445,365
R‐squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
F‐test (Imm. Vs Ref.) 0.21 0.00 25.03 9.96 17.45
Prob>F 0.65 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A3: Robustness of results to country exclusion 
 
Note. The table tests the robustness of employment probability estimates to the exclusion of single (or group of) countries. Column (1) estimates the regression on 
the full sample of countries, reproducing column (3) of Table A1. From column (2) onward, countries are excluded, one at a time, from the sample. In column (13) 
both the UK and Ireland are dropped at the same time. All regressions control for gender (dummy for male), age (dummies for 5-year age groups), education 
(dummies for lower secondary and tertiary education), and host country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Excluded country(s):
None (full 
sample)
Austria Belgium
Cyprus 
and 
Greece
Germany
Italy, 
Portugal 
and 
Spain
France Ireland Netherland Norway Sweden UK
Ireland 
and UK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Immigrant ‐0.070*** ‐0.070*** ‐0.068*** ‐0.072*** ‐0.062*** ‐0.093*** ‐0.064*** ‐0.070*** ‐0.067*** ‐0.070*** ‐0.068*** ‐0.070*** ‐0.071***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Refugee ‐0.183*** ‐0.190*** ‐0.185*** ‐0.186*** ‐0.192*** ‐0.187*** ‐0.189*** ‐0.182*** ‐0.179*** ‐0.184*** ‐0.179*** ‐0.164*** ‐0.162***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 476,518 457,615 463,019 433,135 456,195 315,485 447,543 440,967 418,316 462,995 441,590 428,320 392,769
R‐squared 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23
F‐test (Imm. vs Ref.) 46.35 46.56 46.24 44.04 82.61 29.78 52.26 44.55 39.50 45.70 37.90 24.66 23.31
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
